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I.
THE partition of the Ottoman Empire was the necessary pre-
requisite to the pohtical, economic, and social reforms which
have made possible the e\olution of the modern Turkish republic.
For it is almost inconcei\al)le to think of fundamental moderniza-
tion in an empire at the continental crossroads, with the religion
of Islam at its basis and a population of such great diversity. Only
in a national republic are the great basic reforms of a Mustapha
Kemal Pasha possible—though more than a century of precedent
had prepared the way even for the making of the republic.
The dissolutiim of the old empire immediately f(jllowing the
great war was one of the most important developments in recent
world history. No less astounding has been the regeneration of
the Turkish peoi)le and the advent of the new Near Eastern state.
At its zenith the Turkish Empire was larger than the Roman Empire
ever was. It included territory extending over three continents,
contained more than 1,700,000 square miles of territory and had
a polyglot population of almost 40,000,000. In the days of Suleiman
the Magnificent the empire compared favorably in every respect
with the states of western Europe, and in a day when dynasties
conspired to produce outstanding sovereigns, Suleiman had no
superior on a ^\'estern throne. Since the treaty of Karlowitz the
empire had been on the decline, and had been preserved through the
vears as much b}' the existing balance among, and the conflicting
interests of, the European powers, as by its own internal cohesion,
unity, and strength. Dubbed the "sick man of Europe" by Nicho-
las I, throughout the nineteenth century the downfall of the Sublime
Porte and the crumbling of the state had more than once been sig-
naled. But it was not until the decade immediately preceding the
Great War that the fate of the ancient empire finally was sealed.
The reasons for the decadence and the destruction of the Turk-
ish Empire are not far to seek. Internally the state was made up
of many diverse peoples, none of whom had been efl:'ectively as-
similated under the military and sometimes corrupt rule of the
government at Constantinople. The social, political, and legal or-
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ganization of the state was based on the Shcriat, the sacred law of
Islam, as founded upon or expounded from the Koran. It was there-
fore difficult and at times impossible to reorganize the state system
in order to meet the demands of modem life. Economically the
state became increasingly fettered by the capitulatory regime and
was threatened with becoming the prey of world imperialism as re-
presented by the great European powers. In 1875 it announced its
bankruptcy, while a few years later its economic and financial life
was placed under the control of the European bondholders. More-
over the geographical position of the Ottoman Empire made it
ever subject to aggression on the ])art of the European powers.
even as earlier it ga\"e the Turkish rulers obvious advantages for
world conf|uest. Turkey was at the great crossroads of the conti-
nents—a crossroads which is strewn wath the wrecks of empires.
Strategically and jv)litically as well as economically the Great Powers
were interested in the region. Great Britain desired not only eco-
nomic penetration, but what is more, protection of several routes to
India, whether through the Straits, the Suez canal and Egypt, or
through Anatolia and into Mesopotamia. The Bagdad Railway sys-
tem syml)olized Germany's prize in the imperial struggle in the
Near East. France not only had the largest financial investment in
Turkey, but long had been interested in the cultural and material
development of Syria—ever since the days of Suleiman and Fran-
cis I, if not as far back as the crusades. In the year preceding the
outbreak in 1914, Austria-Hungary and Italy reached out for a
share of the expected spoils of empire. For Russia the dominat-
ing ccncern lay in the fact that fifty per cent of her export trade
went through the narrow and strategic waters of the Straits—the
"key of her house" was in other hands.
The first great step in the partition of the ( )ttoman Empire in
recent years came in the early days of October 1908 when the
Austro-Hungarian government formally proclaimed the annexation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bulgaria announced her indepen-
dence. And the abortive, centralizing, political reforms of the Young
Turks, well intentioned as many of them were, but hastened the
further decomposition of the empire. Following closely on the Bos-
nian e]:)isode, the European center of gravity seemed to shift toward
the Near East, and in 1911-1912 came the Italo-Turkish war, in
which the Turks finally lost not only Cyrenaica and Tripoli in North
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Africa, but the islands of the Dodecanese as welL A modern Rome
was retracing more ancient paths in a new imperiaUsm.
But the Italo-Turkish struggle had far deeper consequences.
Almost instantly the Balkan states, which hated the Turks only
more than they did each other, saw the golden opportunity to set-
tle accounts with the Sublime Porte, free their "brothers" in Mace-
donia, and sohe the age-old Eastern Question. r>y their own ef-
forts, and with the assistance of the diplomacy of tsarist Russia,
they at last succeeded in constituting a l)alkan league, composed of
Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro. The first B)alkan war.
which broke out on October 8, 1912—and which Austria and Rus-
sia tried to prevent—was of short duration, since Turkey soon was
defeated by the allies. The conference of London achieved a treaty
by May 30, \9\3>, but it did not bring peace. Serbia had been blocked
from the Adriatic by both Austria and Italy, and now sought com-
pensation in Macedonia, with the result that internecine war broke
out between the allied (ireeks and Serbs and the Ikdgarians on
June 29, 1913. Rumania participated in this second I'alkan war,
and peace finally was made at Bucharest on August 10. l'U3. Dur-
ing the second struggle the Turks once more seized Adrianople
from the Bulgarians, and with the signing of peace Serbia and
Greece partitioned Macedonia. Greece received both Cavalla and
Salonica, while the question of the Aegean islands, as provided in
the treaty of London, was to remain at the disposition of the Euro-
pean concert. Rumania assumed control of the IMack Sea outlet
of the Danube through the annexation of the Silistria-Balchik dis-
trict in I^)ulgarian Dobrrdja. Thanks to Austria and Italy, Albania,
never too dependent on the old empire, now became an independent
state. Some six weeks later Bulgaria formally retroceded Adrian-
ople, Kirk Kilisse and Dimotika to Turkey. At the end of the Bal-
kan wars, Turkey still was mistress of the region of the Straits, but
her territory in Euro])e was confined to the portion of Thrace from
Adrianople east to the Black Sea and south to the Aegean.
The events of 1913 only presaged the storm which was ahead.
Already the Ottoman Empire appeared to be crumbling to pieces.
Without heroic efiforts on the part of the government and people,
Turkey could not be preserved. Moreover all the European powers
would, and did, watch every move of Constantinople, no matter in
what direction the Porte might turn, since general imperial inter-
ests were involved in the fate of the Turkish empire.
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And numerous turns were possible. At last, perhaps, the "sick
man" might make vigorous efforts at recovery, for he had yet much
vitality. Turkey needed, and sought, reforms of a fundamental
nature—in the realm of national defense, financial support and
civil and economic reorganization. Britain sent a naval mission to
Turkey as well as some administrators. Germany dispatched the
military mission of Liman von Sanders, against which Russia made
such grave protest. France supervised the gcndanncrie and gave
financial assistance in the form of a 500,000,000 franc loan. There
were developments in civil reconstruction. But the fate of the
empire was in other hands—in hands not so much interested in the
rights of peoples as in the spoils of imperialism.
Then during the spring and summer of 1913 there began a series
of manoeuvers on the diplomatic chessboard which prepared the
way for the division of the Ottoman estate into spheres of influence
and interest, a step toward political partition. In March, 1913, Great
Britain and Turkey reached an agreement whereby Turkey recog-
nized British interests in southern Mesopotamia. In July of that
year the German government outlined its desiderata in a possible
partition of Turkey to both Italy and Austria— all of which cen-
tered about the reseau of the Bagdad railway. Negotiations which
had, been carried on for a year finally culminated in the famous
Bagdad railway agreements which Germany made with France and
England in the winter and summer of 1914. In these arrangements
France and Britain not only recognized the German "zone de tra-
vail" in the Bagdad system, but secured their own positions in Syria
and southern Mesopotamia. The partition of an empire was being
discounted in advance, and the powers w-ere calculating both inter-
est and principal together. Russia, it appears, did not favor the de-
mise of the Turk, and was opposed to having such strong neighbors
in close proximity to the Straits. The government of the tsar "strug-
gled only to barricade eastern Anatolia from European concession-
aires."
II.
If the question of of the breakup of the Turkish Empire was on
the carpet when the World War came on, the great struggle itself,
in which four great empires passed into history, was to bring about
the final dissolution. On August 2, 1914, the ruling clique in Tur-
key signed an alliance with Germany, and from that time until her
entry into action Turkey essentially was under the dominance of G€r-
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man military and naval officers in the corntry. There was a chance,
however, that with proper unity of policy and action, the Allies
might have kept the Porte neutral, or even might have brought
Turkey into the war on the side of the Entente. Russia appeared the
only country among the Entente ready to make the necessary and
proper concessions—including not only a guarantee of the German
economic rights in Asia Minor, but Turkish sovereignty over the
islands at the entrance of the Dardanelles, and abolition of the
hated capitulations. Rut on October 28, 1914 the combined Turco-
German fleet, now under the command of a German admiral, at-
tacked the Russian ports on the Black Sea without a war declara-
tion, and precipitated imperial Turkey into the struggle which was
to seal her doom.
Plans already were evolving as to what should be done with the
component parts of the old empire. As early as November 4, Great
Britain formally announced the annexation of Cyprus and about
six weeks later she proclaimed a protectorate over Egypt, but these
regions long had been in the actual control of England. It was
not until the opening of the Dardanelles campaign in Eebruary, 1915,
however, that the serious schemes for the partitioning of the empire
were thrown into sharp relief. There were now to be several claim-
ants to the heritage. Among the Balkan states there were Bulgaria
and Greece, whose aspirations in Thrace and Macedonia were so
fundamentally opposed. And now Greece, under the direction of
the imaginative and brilliant A'enizelos, offered assistance to the
Entente, ])roviding proper guarantees against Bulgaria were of-
fered and the Asiatic territory of Smyrna were accorded her. But
Russia, fearing Greek entry into Constantinople as a British puppet,
not only forbade Greek action in that region, but for the first time
in March, 191.5, made an, outright demand for control of Constan-
tinople and the Straits. On March 12, Great Britain assented to
the Russian proposal, lest the Muscovite be driven out of the war,
but Russia was to recognize British and French commercial in-
terests, and Britain was to receive the neutral zone in Persia (as
of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907). It was not until one
month later that France gave belated consent to the Russian demand,
receiving in return assent to her own rights in Syria. At last the
"historic task" would be achieved in Tsargrad.
The Constantinople issue, however, raised other problems in-
volving the entire question of the future of the Turkish Empire.
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When Italy signed the treaty of London of April 25, 1915, whereby
she was to enter the war against Germany, she did so not only with
the understanding that Austrian territory on the Adriatic should
be hers, but that she would retain the Dodecanese islands and re-
ceive the district of Adalia on the coast of Asia Minor. At the same
time both France and Great Britain were drawing the blue prints
of their claims in .Asiatic Turkey. The rights (-f peoples did not
count when the great stakes of imperialism were at ])lay, or when
a world war was to be won or lost.
After more than a year of bargaining the famous tri])artite agree-
ment of April, 1916, between Great Britain, France, and Russia
was worked out. Under this arrangement England was to obtain
southern ^Mesopotamia with Bagdad and access to two ports on
the Syrian coast, and an added zone of influence to the north and
west of B.agdad. France was to have Syria and the Adana vilayet,
western Kurdistan and Mosul, with a zone of influence in the
desert east of Syria. Russia would receive Armenia and a part
of southern Kurdistan. Palestine temporarily was to be placed un-
der an international regime, and only later was designated to become
a Jewish national "home"" (November, 1917) under British control.
France and Britain were to construct Arab states or confederations
in their spheres of influence. Another document, known as the
Sykes-Picot accord, May 9-16, 1916, embodied these terms.. Such
were the plans for the inheritance of the Ottoman estate. It did
not matter that B.ritain already had made promises to two groups
of Arabs which were in fi-ndamental disagreement with the Franco-
British schemes. The .^ rabs did not know this until the ?)Olsheviks
published the documents, and the "independence" of the Arabs was
little more than a division of Arab territory between France and
Britain.
But the war did not go so well for the Allies. Bulgaria entered
the struggle on the side of the Central powers in October, 1915,
after being promised Macedonia, and access to the Aegean Sea
through western Thrace. The Dardanelles campaign ended in fail-
ure and resulted in the evacuation of the Gallipoli ])eninsula in De-
cember. 1915-January, 1916. Greece finally entered the war against
Turkey when there was not much left to be done, expecting to share
in the spoils of victory on the coast of Asia Minor near Smyrna.
The year 1917 witnessed noteworthy events which had their
eft'ect on the future of the Turkish Empire. In March the tsarist
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government gave way before the bourgeois revolution and a pro-
visional government was established in Russia. And in April the
United States entered the fray on the side of the Entente. Even under
the provisional Russian government, the foreign ministry adhered to
the secret treaties and to the policy of acquiring control over the
Straits and Constantinople. The cabinet, however, under the hard
pressure of the Petrograd Soviet, finally enunciated the doctrine of
no annexations and no indemnities, and stated that Russia sought im-
perial domination over no foreign territory. President Wilson was
known to be opposed to the policy framed within the secret agree-
ments, but the Allies promised Italy additional territory in Asiatic
Turkey through the treaty of St. Jean de ^laurienne shortly after
the American entry into the war.
When the Bolsheviks came into power in November, 1^17, they
denounced the entire edifice oi the secret treaties and began to
pul)lish their contents to a rather startled and disillusioned world.
The communist pronunciamento had much to do with the Lloyd
George statement of January 5, 1918 that Britain would not molest
the Turkish "homelands"" in Anatolia and Thrace, but would in-
sist on internationalization of the Straits, and would not return the
liberated areas of the old empire—Alesopotamia, Syria, and Pales-
tine—to the "execrated" rule of the Turk. This was a liberal com-
mitment, but neither France nor Britain was giving up territory
to which it aspired. Three days later President Wilson announced
his "fourteen points" and declared that "the Turkish portions of the
present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty,
but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule"
should be allowed an opportunity for autonomous development.
The Straits, of course, were to be internationalized.
But the war went on, and despite increasingly liberal pronounce-
ments, Britain and France reached an agreement in December, 1917,
which bade fair to complete their schemes of partition, when France
was given control of southern Russia, and Britain was assured con-
trol of the Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia and Kurdistan. This w-as
accomplished almost at the very time that the treaty of Brest-Litovsk
was ])eing framed and forced on a ])eaten and distracted Russia!
By the end of the war the Allies w'ere almost in complete control
of Asiatic Turkey. Bulgaria's surrender in September, 1918, pre-
pared the way for the Turkish capitulation in the armistice of Mu-
dros of October 30, under which the Allies were to occupy all the
™,.^^? L*W in^^^^. iM/^\ P##*'-' .d^^'
'H='tf-<^^1^,^ n»' '^'i^'^^ '^I'^-Kr i
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forts of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, and Turkish troops
throughout the empire were to be demobilized. Provision was even
made for Allied occupation of almost any part of Turkey which
they desired to seize.
Shortly after, and only four days before the world conflict came
to an end, France and England announced the emancipation of Syria
and Mesopotamia from the Turks as the role which "the two Allied
Governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories." Then
in December, on the eve of the Paris conference. Great Britain se-
cured both Mosul and Palestine, the latter to become a Jewish
"home," though it had been Arab and Moslem for 1300 years!
France needed British support for her Rhenish and other aspira-
tions, and was willing to make the trade. Britain no longer had to
fear Russia on the north of Mosul in Kurdistan, and no doubt the
London government felt that a British Palestine was a better safe-
guard for Egypt and the Suez canal than a Palestine under inter-
national control.
III.
No more important problem came before the Paris conference
than that which the Turkish cjuestion raised. The powers were
agreed that the Ottoman Empire should be partitioned, but so con-
flicting were their aims that a settlement was impossible for more
than a year, and even then it proved abortive. The question of the
Straits alone concerned all the European powers at the conference
;
and it involved the peace of the world as well. There were other is-
sues : Thrace, the future of the "Turkish homelands," Armenia.
Syria, ^Mesopotamia, Kurdistan and Palestine. Nor should the strug-
gle for economic rights in general, nor the contest for Mosul oil in
particular be omitted from that chronicle. That there would be a
future Turkish state was to be taken for granted. What should
be done with it was a very different, as well as a very difficult ques-
tion. In the end it was to be answered only by the miraculous rise
of the Turkish nationalists themselves. As to the former subjugated
peoples, Mr. Wilson favored the mandate system as the only solu-
tion whereby peoples not yet ready for freedom might be placed un-
der political tutelage pending complete independence. It was under
the mandate system eventually that the old empire finally was di-
vided up at the San Remo Conferences of April and December,
1920. As the United States had frowned upon a mandate for the
Constantinopolitan state in the region of the Straits, so now the
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American government rejected the Armenian mandate. Rut France
received control over Syria, while Britain took over the Palestine
mandate, as well as the new Iraq kinjg^dom which was created in
the land of the two rivers. The American government, however,
held up final action on the eastern mandates for more than two
years until an adjustment could be made with reference to cer-
tain American economic claims in those regions.
The policy of partition reached its apogee at Sevres on August
10, 1920. Xow both the Hejaz and Armenia became "independent,"
and the British once more sought to detach Kurdistan from Turkey.
Britain and France registered their control over the mandates al-
ready awarded, and promised Italy a sphere (which never materi-
alized) in southern Anatolia. Greece, already detailed to "enforce"
the peace against the Turks, was to receive not only Smyrna and
the Dodecanese, but the islands at the entrance of the Dardanelles,
Thrace and Gallipoli. In addition, the Straits were to be placed un-
der such "international" control as to render them ever subject to
the menace of British sea power. This was a threat not only to
Turkey, l)Ut to Soviet Russia, the southern geography of which had
not been altered by the revolution. Finally, through the continu-
ance of the capitulatory regime and the insertion of very serious
restrictive financial and economic clauses, what was left of Turkey
would be deprived of all real independence. But the treaty of Sevres
miscarried, and brought not peace but the sword.
The treaty of Sevres was broken before the ink of the signa-
tures had dried. The Turks could not be pressed any farther. The
grasping policy of the Allies drove them to violence and they now
prepared for desperate resistance. The "sick man" was to rise from
his bed and defeat his enemies. The landing of the Greeks at
Smyrna on ~Slay 15. 1919, turned loose a destructive force which
lit the burning torch of nationalism on the plateaus of Anatolia.
In the far places of Erzerum and Sivas, ^lustapha Kemal Pasha
summoned his hosts to do battle for the defense of the fatherland.
For the first time, perhaps, a national patriotism had been aroused.
The story of what followed is one of the most amazing dramas of
our recent history. On ]\Iarch 16, 1920, British troops took
possession of Constantinople, adding more fuel to the fire. In the
following month—April 23—the newly organized Grand National
Assembly, led by Mustapha Kemal met at Ankara and adopted the
"national pact," modern Turkey's declaration of independence. It
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decreed freedom for Turkey, signed away the phantom of empire,
stipulated commercial freedom for the Straits, and guaranteed the
rights of the peoples of Turkey. But accejit the old political, ju-
dicial, and economic capitulations which had bound the empire hand
and foot, it world not. There were now two governments in Turkey:
the one at Constantinople under definite I'ritish control ; the other
at Ankara engaged in a life and death struggle with the Greeks,
which lasted from the fatal landing in May, 1919, to Septem-
ber, 1922.
Of that struggle we shall say but little. The adventurous policy
of \'enizelos and Lloyd George, now seeking dominance in the
Near East through Greece, had produced the conflict. The Turk
was fighting for the right to live ; the Greek for empire. Both
Greece and Turkey, as a matter of fact, were struggling to utter
exhaustion, though the Greeks had the better of it throughout 1921.
But in March, 1921, the Ankara government brought about a veri-
table diDlomatic revolution in the East. After settling accounts with
her neighbors, Turkey succeeded in making an agreement with
France (March 9) and three days later with Italy, providing for
the economic development of southern Anatolia. At odds with
Britain ever since the Paris conference, the French were now alien-
ated over the Rhenish policy, and almost literally at the point of
the sword with Britain in the East. Great Britain would now have
to achieve her Eastern policy without either French or Italian aid.
Finally on March 16 Turkey and Soviet Russia, whose fundamen-
tal interests in the Turkish question did not differ from those of
the tsarist regime, signed an agreement providing for regulation
of the Straits and ceding Kars and Ardahan to Turkey. Once more
a common danger brought the Turk and the Muscovite together,
and it did not matter that the one was now nationalist, and the
other in the vanguard of the communist revolution. In the fall
of that year (October 13) the Kemalists signed the treaty of Kars
with the Caucasus states. With the signature of the Franklin-
Bouillon agreement with France in October the breach between
France and Britain in the East became complete.
Little wonder is it that in the following year Turkey succeeded
in driving the Greeks into the Mediterranean sea at Smyrna—in
September, 1922. Fearful lest the victorious Turks might enter the
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zones of the Straits, the British government rushed reinforcements
to its troops at Chanak, and called on the dominions, the former
allies, the Balkan states, and even the American government to help
defend civilization at the Dardanelles. But the world did not an-
swer the summons. On October 11, the armistice of Mudania put
an end to the Greco-Turkish war, and a few days later the Lloyd
Georg^e coalition came to an end. After eleven years of constant
fighting, the Turks had won their war for independence. Thanks
to their fighting capacity, their organizing ability, their moral vigor,
and to the military genius of Alustapha Kemal winged victory
perched on the Turkish standards.
The call was now issued for a peace conference which was to
meet at Lausanne, and which was to consider all the ramifications
of the Eastern question, provide a new regime for the straits and
bring peace to the Orient. The conference was one of the most
important diplomatic conclaves of the post-war period in Europe,
and all the great powers, including the L'nited States and Soviet
Russia, were represented. Since the Allies invited representatives
from both the Constantinople and Ankara governments, the Grand
National Assembly, almost on the eve of the gathering—Novem-
ber 1, 1922—replied by abolishing the sultanate, and the Constanti-
nople government came to an ignominious end. Henceforth Ana-
tolia would rule in Turkey
!
Having w^on independence on the battlefield, the Turks, led by
the astute, shrewd Ismet Pasha, had yet to win their freedom at
the conference table. But again peace was delayed, for the Turks
were not to be browbeaten at Lausanne. And the great powers
—
Great Britain, the United States, France, and Soviet Russia in par-
ticular—were in such opposition that the first conference broke
up on February 4, 1923, without reaching a settlement. Questions
of imperialism, of territory, of concessions and oil (in which the
L'^nited States was seriously interested) and of water routes were
very difficult to settle—especially when selfish interests played the
dominant note . Xor did the Turkish ratification of the American
Chester project ease the situation. Finally, however, the confer-
ence reconvened in April, and after a bitter fight over concessions
and the problem of the capitulations, it produced a treaty on July
24, 1923. By the new treaty Turkey surrendered all claims to prac-
tically all the territory which the war had torn from her, though
she disputed Britain's pretentions to the ^Mosul vilayet and its riches.
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But the new republic received all of Anatolia and in Europe,
not only Constantinople but eastern Thrace with Adrianople and
Gallipoli. Greek inhabitants were to be exchanged for Turkish
inhabitants of Greece, a cruel but perhaps necessary solution of that
issue. Non-Moslem minorities were to be protected, but the Greek
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patriarchate in Constantinople was to be shorn of its poHtical power.
War indemnities were renounced mutually. Finally, in return for
the abolition of financial, economic, judicial, and political capitula-
tions, in existence since the days of Suleiman—which alone would
enable them to live in independence and freedom'—the Turks agreed
to the internationalization, freedom, and demilitarization of the
Straits. These waters were to be placed under an international
commission responsible to the League of Nations. Alone among
the Central powers, the Turks had made a negotiated peace, and
they had done it well.
Lausanne had sounded the death knell of an ancient empire,
but announced the birth of a new Turkish re])ublic ! By 1923 the
old polygot empire, with its antiquated political and social structure,
which had failed to solve its national problems, had given way to
a national republic, which already had set its sails toward the West.
Torn from a time-honored anchorage, some 14,000,000 people, most
of whom lived on the Anatolian plateau, now set out on the difficult
seas of modernization. L^nwittinglv the process of partition of the
empire became a part of the development of the national state which
was becoming modern under the guidance of the republican dicta-
torship of Mustapha Kemal.
Whether Lausanne means complete peace to the Orient remains
for the future to tell. The strategic geography of the Xear East
remains unaltered. The problem of the Dardanelles and the Bos-
phorus continues, though the region has been "internationalized"
and demilitarized. Xor has all been tranquil in the "liberated" re-
gions which France and Britain took over from the old empire,
as Syria, Palestine, Iraq, and Egypt bear ample witness. But modern
Turkey is free from the corrupting influences of a worn-out em-
pire. Out of the crucible of the most terrible war in historv a
new Turkey has emerged—a new Turkey in a new Orient, a modern
state which may teach many lessons in that new Orient. The epic
of war and carnage has given way to the epic of modernization.
But the story of the modernization of this old Moslem land re-
mains vet to be told.
